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The search for appropriate structures for delivering public services has been a recurring theme within the literature of public administration. Early municipal reforms were motivated by concern for eliminating corruption associated with basic services such as police and sanitation.' In the 1960s, decentralization was advocated as a means for improving the responsiveness and accessibility of governmental services. ' The most recent search for organizational improvements has dwelled predominantly on mechanisms of privatization as means for achieving greater efficiencies.' Privatization usually means increasing the role of private firms in production and distribution, although it may also involve private sector planning and financing. Several strategies accomplish privatization. One is what Savas called load shedding, turning over a public service to the private ~e c t o r .~ Another privatization strategy is to franchise or license producers to operate in a jurisdiction. Perhaps the most common form of privatization is contracting. Contracting allows governments to establish service standards, but it gives private contractors the choice of how to produce the service.
This paper tests the viability of particular privatization strategies in the context of urban bus transit. Using 1980 and 1981 data reported under Section 15 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, it compares five existing organizational forms on a variety of efficiency, effectiveness, and utilization indicators.
Organization of Mass Transit Services
The evolution of organizational forms within the urban transit industry during this century is well documented.Trivately owned firms carried most transit riders at the turn of the century. The mortality rate for these organizations was quite high, especially after 1946, as transit riders shifted to the use of automobiles. However, most surviving transit agencies remained privately owned until 1964. Beginning in 1964, when federal capital subsidies became available to local governments, increasing numbers of systems were acquired by public agencies. Today, most urban bus systems are publicly owned. Five different types of ownership and management arrangements exist in urban transit today: privately owned and managed systems; systems owned and managed exclusively by either a general government or special authority; and systems owned by general governments or special authorities and operated by a private management service company. In the latter two arrangements, the contracts between the government agency and management service company normally provide: a resident team of professionals; technical support for the team from the firm's central office; and control of the day-to-day operations of the s y~t e m .~ Financial terms and conditions of the contracts are usually on a fixedfee or percentage of gross fare-box revenue basis, with provisions for inflation. ' The incidence and geographic distribution of the five organizational forms are depicted in Table 1 . The most common organizational form is the publicly managed special authority, which represents about one third of all transit organizations in the sample. The second most common form is the publicly managed general govern-ment, but general government systems managed by contractors are also fairly common. Contract-managed special authorities and privately owned and operated systems are present in about equal frequencies in the population, but in proportions well below the other types.
The recent surge of interest in privatization reflects
Organizational form varies quite substantially across regions of the country. Privately owned firms receiving federal subsidy are highly concentrated. Seventy-seven percent of these firms are in the New York-New Jersey region. In fact, all of the privately owned, subsidized systems are located in three of the 10 Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) regions. Sixtytwo percent of the publicly owned and contractmanaged systems are in the south and central portions of the nation. Publicly owned and managed systems are more geographically dispersed. Among the publicly owned systems, special authorities represent a majority in the eastern half of the nation. General governments own a majority of systems in three regions, South Central, Mountain, and Pacific Northwest.
Research on Performance and Transit Organization
Research on the comparative performance of transit organizational forms has produced highly diverse r e s~l t s .For example, from a total of 13 studies conducted over a 20-year period, six found that private ownership is more efficient than public, four arrived at the opposite conclusion, and three uncovered no diff e r e n c e~.These studies also found that municipal governments tend to be more efficient than special authorities, but this finding has usually been attributed to limitations in the measurement of municipal overhead costs and not to real efficiency differences between the two ownership types.
Much less research has been done on the efficiency of management service contracts, and the findings are also mixed. Barnum concluded that publicly owned firms were more efficient than contract firms.1° In contrast, Pucher and his associates found that contract management obtained lower per hour costs and was, therefore, more productive."
In addition to efficiency, organizational form has been linked to other performance considerations. For example, Foster concluded that service, measured by the number of vehicle stops, increased for public firms after 1966 while the average vehicle speed for public and private firms remained e q~i v a l e n t . '~ Barbour and Zerrillo found that public bus systems usually achieved greater levels of passenger carrying effectiveness than private operators. l 3 An aspect of performance not studied to date is the equity of the services delivered by particular organizational forms. Because two major goals of transit are to increase mobility within urban areas and to provide transportation for the transit dependent, the distribution of services is an important performance criterion. Research has shown that public agencies have not increased fare levels to cover rising operating costs while private firms have consistently increased fares to keep pace with rising costs.14 The distributional consequences of these fare trends have not been assessed, but they could have important equity implications.
To summarize, although these studies as a group provide some conflicting results, they strongly suggest the prospect of performance differences across organizational forms. In a majority of studies in which differences were found, private firms were found to be more efficient than government operators. While private firms may have an efficiency edge, public systems appear to attract more riders because of their efforts to hold down fares. Among publicly owned systems, general governments have been found to be more efficient than special authorities. Furthermore, variations in operating environments (e.g., population densities) appear to be important moderators of organizational form-performance relationships. Given these generalizations drawn from prior research and theory, four hypotheses were proposed. Hypothesis 1: Privately owned and managed firms and public agencies that are operated by contractors will be more efficient than publicly owned and managed systems.
Hypothesis 2: General government systems will be more efficient than special authorities.
Hypothesis 3: Significant tradeoffs between performance dimensions (e.g., generating revenues vs. assuring access) will be reflected across organizational types.
Hypothesis 4: Urban system characteristics will affect performance.
Methods
Until recently a nationwide, uniform system of accounts and records for transit performance evaluation has not been available. All U.S. transit systems applying for federal operating assistance have been required since 1978 to report detailed information concerning the status of the agency's financial and other environments. These data have permitted development of a set of performance indicators that are appropriate for organizational comparison^.'^ The performance indicators are listed in the Appendix.16 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for representative indicators. These data reveal some sharp distinctions among the organizational types, although no inferences about the significance of these difference~ should be drawn from the raw data because they are not adjusted for system characteristics. The greatest differences exist between the private systems and all other systems in the areas of operating revenue per operating subsidy, total bus subsidy per total vehicle hour, and total vehicle miles per accident. On the other hand, where differences might be expected, for instance, on the revenue vehicle hour per operating expense indicator, the private systems are roughly the same as the other types, except those owned by general governments whose unit costs are lower than the private systems.
The initial sample used for more rigorous statistical analysis consisted of 249 transit agencies in 1980 and 246 in 1981. These agencies were selected from a larger population of agencies included in the UMTA Section 15 reports. The agencies eliminated consisted of those with no fixed-route service and agencies with a peak vehicle count of less than 10. This analysis excludes a few public agencies that did not appear in the Section 15 reports and unsubsidized private bus lines. However, the sample includes nearly all but the very smallest bus operations.
One difference between the 1980 and 1981 databases should be noted because it bears on the ability to compare results for the two years. The makeup of organizations reporting under Section 15 changed somewhat from 1980 to 1981 so that the samples are not exactly comparable. Specifically, 37 organizations are not shared across the two years, 18 which appear only in 1980 and 19 only in 1981. Some of these changes reflect the dissolution of a private firm or its public acquisition. These changes may affect the year-to-year results, but should not radically diminish their comparability.
The total set of performance variables in the Appendix were analyzed using principal components analysis to determine the underlying conceptual structure. Factor analysis reduces a large set of data to a smaller set of "components" or "factors" which portray the underlying relationships among the variables. From the 25 performance variables that were entered into the analysis, eight factors were identified. These eight factors accounted for 86 percent of the variance in the original set of variables. The Appendix portrays the eight factors, their conceptual interpretation, and the loadings of each variable on the factors. The loading of each variable on the respective factors can be interpreted as the correlation of the variable with the factor; high factor loadings represent high correlations. Determination of what constitutes an acceptable loading is arbitrary, but a .5 cutoff value is a conservative choice. '' Ownership-management structures were measured by category variables. The five categories were:
1. General government ownership, public management.
2. Special authority ownership, public management. 3. General government ownership, contract management.
4. Special authority ownership, contract management.
5. Private ownership, private management. Data on the ownership and management of target systems were gathered from UMTA, American Public Transit Association (APTA), and American Transit Association (ATA) reports and from telephone inquiries and letters to state departments of transportation and local transit agencies.
Several types of statistical techniques were used to investigate the four research questions, including analysis of variance (ANOVA), paired-group means tests, and multiple linear regression with metric and dummy variables. In the interest of brevity, results are presented for the multiple regression analysis only.
Multiple regression analysis was used to assess the overall impact of organizational form, controlling for characteristics of the transit agency environment. Factor scores from each of the eight performance dimensions were predicted by metric and dummy variables representing system characteristics and organizational forms.18 Three system characteristics-number of peak vehicles, peak-to-base service ratio, and average system
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Performance Indicator
The three system variables were forced into the regression equation in multiple mode prior to the organizational form dummy variables. This procedure extracted any variance shared between the system and organizational form variables on the assumption that the system variables are causally prior to organizational form. The system characteristics exhibited consistent and significant relationships for both years for several performance indicators. All three system characteristics were significantly related to revenue generation in 1980 and 198 1. Larger systems, those with higher peak-tobase ratios and systems with higher average speeds generated significantly greater amounts of revenue. The positive and significant coefficients for the peak vehicles-service consumption relationship suggests that larger systems are utilized to a greater extent by consumers than smaller systems. Average speeds for a system influence labor and vehicle efficiency in opposite ways. Systems with higher average speeds tended to have lower labor efficiency but greater vehicle efficiency.
The coefficients for several of the system characteristic-performance relationships agree in sign, but are significant for only one of the two years. For example, the average system speed-service consumption relationship is negative for both years but significant in 1981 only. The least stable year-to-year relationships involve the safety performance indicator. In 1980, all system characteristics-safety relationships were significant; none were in 1981, and the sign was reversed in two of the three cases. The proportion of explained variance also dropped from 41 percent to 8 percent. Given the myriad factors that can affect accident rates, the year-to-year differences may reflect the volatility of this indicator.
Even after removing the variance associated with system characteristics first, several organizational form relationships are significant. Private systems appear to be quite different from the other four types. They produced greater output per dollar, generated more revenues, and used less public assistance. In 1981, the private system achieved significantly better safety records than the other types of systems. It is important to keep in mind the volatility of the safety indicator, as noted above and as reflected in the nearly significant negative coefficient for private systems in 1980.
Publicly managed special authorities also stand out somewhat from the other types. These systems were significantly more effective than other publicly owned systems in generating revenues in 1981. In 1980 the output per dollar relationship was positive and significant, whereas in 1981 this relationship was negative and the labor efficiency relationship also was negative and significant.
Discussion
The empirical analysis provided mixed support for the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. Private systems were positively and significantly related to the output per dollar indicator. However, the efficiency results for contract-managed systems were no better than for publicly managed systems. Thus, private systems appear to be more efficient than the other organizational forms, but contract-managed systems are not.
This was the first test of the relative performance of general government and special authority ownership using uniform accounts as specified by Section 15 reporting requirements. Our results appear to confirm what others have argued: that past research findings possibly overstated the relative efficiency of general governments. Hypothesis 2, which posited that general governments would be more efficient than special districts, was not supported.
Hypothesis 3 was only weakly supported. Ownership was shown to have a significant influence on the generation of revenues and, to a lesser extent, on public assistance levels. Safety also appeared to receive varying emphasis.
System characteristics were significant determinants of several performance dimensions and, therefore, hypothesis 4 was supported. Of the eight performance dimensions, seven were significantly associated with at least one of two system characteristics in either 1980 or 1981.
What should be made of the finding that private systems appear to be more efficient than publicly owned systems? One interpretation reflects a deterministic view: forces in the environments of private organizations encourage efficiency, and analogous forces for public organizations discourage efficiency. The private systems in this investigation were predominantly located in the northeast, within the New York-New Jersey urbanized area. These subsidized firms successfully negotiated financing arrangements with local public agencies that required only partial dependence on the fare box and provided some financial stability. They also benefitted from a favorable mix of local, commuter, and intercity bus service which may have affected their efficiency.19 Teal and Giuliano describe the special characteristics of these systems:
Two of the most striking characteristics of existing private commuter bus services are that they have been in operation for many years . . . and that they predominantly serve specialized markets. The commuter bus operations serve areas with strong CBD's (central business districts) characterized by heavily congested highway access and very high parking costs. Workers commute long distances, usually 25-30 miles or more, or are very price conscious and thus willing to accept equipment with fewer amenities-notably the use of school buses or other old vehicles-in return for cost savings."
Whether or not the superior efficiencies of private firms can be generalized, however, our results do contradict a recent assertion about the inefficiencies of sub- I Q ,? .I; 0.
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COMPARATlVE PERFORMANCE 1N URBAN BUS TRANSIT sidized, private systems: ". . . the private operators have traditional monopolistic operations and a guaranteed city subsidy to cover their deficits. The end result is little incentive toward low cost, efficient operat i~n . "~' On the contrary, despite partial subsidy, cost efficiency was apparently an important objective for the private operators in this sample. And, as suggested by Teal and Giuliano, costs are held down by private systems by running older, possibly more accident-prone buses for longer periods of time. Thus, although the analysis confirms the efficiency advantage of private firms, it is unclear whether such results can be duplicated on a large scale given the specialized circumstances surrounding these operators. The history of conversion of transit systems from private to public suggests another interpretation for the higher efficiency of private firms, one linked to the purposive nature of organizations. As Holtoff and Knighton have argued: "It is not because operations are public that they are unproductive, but the reverse: unproductive operations tend to become Therefore, the comparisons simply confirm what some observers argue should be obvious-but which we often ignore in policy debates-that public organizations are inherently less efficient than private because of their unique social roles.
This line of reasoning-that the performance of the different types of organizations is a product of social purpose rather than environmental determinism-can be extended to interpretation of the overall performance profiles. Different organizational types might be conceptualized as reflections of their constitutions, i.e., "conceptions of legitimate purpose or goals, and conceptions of legitimate authority wielded in pursuit of them. " Employing this perspective, the performance profiles can be viewed as the result of initial decisions about problems or organizational purpose rather than outputs from day-to-day decisions. 24 Another interesting result was that contract-managed systems performed no better than publicly managed systems. These results for contract-managed systems may have resulted from the contracting environment. The fixed-cost or percentage-of-revenue contracts common in transit provide few incentives for efficiency and cost-cutting. In addition, competitive environments may be weakened by the edge of "first hand experience." Once a firm has provided contracted service, there is inertia in the environment which inhibits switching to another c o n t r a c t~r .~~
In the ongoing debate about the merits of contract management, our results came down strongly on the side of those who have argued that management service companies have no financial risk at stake and, therefore, perform no better than public management. Because contract-managed agencies remain public monopolies, they are unable to capture the competitive nature of the private market. Furthermore, since the professional management team is usually only a small portion of an agency's staff, the incentives for most employees are much like the civil service arrangements in public bureaucracies.
There recently has been some recognition of these inadequacies. "Incentive" contracts are now being considered as possible substitutes for standard cost-plusfixed-fee contracts. The idea behind incentive contracts is quite simple: "Profit is the basic motive of business. This is the fundamental principle behind the incentive c o n t r a~t . "~W hile such reasoning is appealing, the successful implementation of complex incentive contracts in the public sector has not been documented. Incentive contracts also fail to attack potentially critical problems inherent in existing arrangements: (1) the absence of alternative service providers; and (2) constraints on managers and incentives for employees in any governmental setting.
Organizational form varies quite substantially across regions of the country. Privately owned firms receiving federal subsidy are highly concentrated.
As a final point in considering the results for contract management, system idiosyncracies rather than the performance characteristics analyzed here may determine the exact goals noted in the contract. Transit authorities have sometimes turned to management firms to solve "insoluble problems." Contract target goals have included "increased frequency," "increased reliability," "lower labor costs," and "increased ridership." With idiosyncratic and system-specific goals in the contract, the goals of management service companies may not be congruent with the performance dimensions of this study. Thus, an understanding of the real effects of contract management-both positive and negative-may have escaped the analytic approach used in this research.
Conclusions
The conventional wisdom about organizational form and performance has, in part, been borne out by this research. Purely private organizations generally are perceived as efficient producers of goods and services. Our empirical results support this viewpoint in that privately owned and managed transit systems were found to perform significantly better on output per dollar than four other types of organizations. The most important qualification is that the private organizations in our sample were subsidized systems located predominantly in the New York-New Jersey area, and, therefore, may not be representative of all private systems.
As significant as the support found for the relative efficiency of private systems, however, was evidence about the relative efficiencies of contract managed systems. Contrary to our expectations, contractmanaged systems were no more efficient than publicly managed systems. This finding was replicated across several indicators, including output/dollar and vehicle and maintenance efficiency.
We indicated that it may not be appropriate to evaluate contract systems according to a generalized set of performance dimensions. Their goals may differ quite radically from publicly owned and managed systems and from private systems. Future research might include case studies that assess the objectives of contract-managed public systems to ascertain whether their goals differ in any significant ways from other systems. Such case studies might be useful for identifying constraints upon efficient operation of contract systems and for explaining precisely why contracting has become so popular in recent years. There also would be some advantage if future research expanded the range of criteria used to assess the performance of different organizational forms. Because Section 15 contains no census-type data, we were unable to investigate the equity attributes of different organizational forms. Without such data, important questions cannot be addressed: What are the redistributive effects of different organizational forms? Does each organizational form allocate services simi-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW larly to socioeconomic groups? These social welfare issues have not been addressed directly because of limitations in our data. However, they are central to the issue of trade-offs involved in choices between organizational forms.
A third area in which further research would be helpful is the interaction between organizational form and system characteristics. An implicit assumption of much structure-performance research is that an appropriate organizational structure is the subject of a conscious choice by an organization's leadership. However, seldom are managers and politicians able to make such rational choices. Are particular organizational forms better adapted than others for certain environments? Prior research suggests that organizational form reflects an increasing specialization of a city's upper and middle management with respect to transportat i~n .~' The questions above, and undoubtedly others, need to be investigated to provide a better foundation for assessing service delivery alternatives. ~u t p u t /~o l l a r : system-wide performance in terms of unit costs of service produced, represented by positive loadings of total vehicle miles and revenue vehicle hours per operating expense and negative loading of annual wage per operator.
Notes

~2
Seriice Consumption: level of service consumed by riders as indicated by high positive loadings for passengers per operating expense and passenger trips per revenue vehicle hour.
Public Assistance: level of operating subsidies as represented by high positive loadings of variables such as total subsidy per total vehicle hour and total subsidy per revenue vehicle hour.
Labor Efficiency: extent of productive utilization of human resources as reflected in the high positive loadings of total vehicle hours per employee and revenue vehicle hours per operating employee.
Vehicle Efficiency: extent of vehicle utilization represented by high loadings for total vehicle miles per peak vehicle and total vehicle hours per peak vehicle.
Safety: accident proneness within the system, represented by high positive loadings of total vehicle miles per accident and revenue vehicle hours per accident.
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